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This article examines the effect of different other-regarding preference types on the emergence of
altruistic punishment behavior from an evolutionary perspective. Our findings corroborate, com-
plement, and interlink the experimental and theoretical literature that has shown the importance
of other-regarding behavior in various decision settings. We find that a selfish variant of inequity
aversion is sufficient to quantitatively explain the level of punishment observed in contemporary
experiments: If disadvantageous inequity aversion is the predominant preference type, altruistic
punishment emerges in our model to a level that precisely matches the empirical observations. We
use a new approach that closely combines empirical results from a public goods experiment together
with an evolutionary simulation model. Hereby we apply ideas from behavioral economics, complex
system science, and evolutionary biology.
The convergence of individual behaviors to common
norms and the punishment of norm violators is an of-
ten observed pattern in groups of animals and human
societies [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. From small cliques, to the so-
cial order in groups and tribes, all the way to the le-
gal frameworks of countries, punishment is a widespread
mechanism underlying the formation of common norms
[6, 7, 8]. In particular, altruistic punishment, i.e., the
punishment of norm violators at one’s own cost without
personal benefit, is frequent in social dilemmas and is
often used to explain the high level of cooperation in hu-
mans [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Within standard economic theory,
which relies on rational selfishness and the dominance of
self-regarding preferences, such behaviors are puzzling, if
not disrupting. This observation calls for the identifica-
tion of the generative mechanism(s) underlying altruistic
punishment and how its occurrence may be context de-
pendent.
Laboratory experiments and field studies suggest
that egalitarian motives and other-regarding preferences,
which relate a person’s decision to her social environ-
ment, have a significant influence in social dilemmas and
in bargaining [13, 14, 15, 16]. Several extensions of
the standard economic approach provide descriptions of
other-regarding preferences by postulating new terms in
utility functions to account for relative income prefer-
ences, envy, inequality aversion and altruism [17, 18, 19].
While these approaches are based on plausible assump-
tions, their evolutionary validation remains vague and
their quantitative coherence with empirical data unveri-
fied.
There is growing evidence from a variety of studies
that pro-social preferences have emerged in hominids over
hundreds and thousands of years, with deep roots go-
ing further back as evidenced from recent studies on pri-
mates [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The diversity of behavioral
traits found in different human cultures may result from
different evolutionary trajectories as well as distinct rel-
ative influence of the cultural versus genetic heritages
[8, 25, 26]. A composite picture is emerging, according
to which the perception of fairness, the reaction to unfair
behavior and the individual’s response to its social envi-
ronment in general, are encoded both in cultural norms
and in genes [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33].
Cultural norms and genes appear to be subjected to
complex coevolutionary processes occurring over a spec-
trum of different time scales. Cultural evolution is
shaped by biological conditions, while, simultaneously,
genes are altered in response to the evolutionary forces
induced by the cultural context. The co-evolutionary
dynamics and inter-dependencies of genes and cultural
norms constitutes our starting point to understand the
properties of social preferences revealed in experimental
economics, field studies and, of course, in real life.
Experiments on public goods and social dilemma
games provide convenient tools to study social prefer-
ences in well-defined scenarios under controlled condi-
tions. In particular when designed with the opportunity
to punish other subjects at own costs, altruistic behavior
is manifested [9, 10, 35, 36, 37]. In these experiments,
one can study in details what controls the predisposition
of humans to bear the costs associated with punishments
of free riders, and how it may improve the welfare of
the group. Even in one-shot interactions in public good
games for which reputation and reciprocal effects are ab-
sent, punishment, which is costly to the punisher and
thus in contradiction with rational choice theory, is fre-
quently observed [9, 10, 38].
Here we develop computer simulations of synthetic
agents within an agent-based model (ABM), that de-
scribes the long-term co-evolution of norms and genes
in populations being exposed to a typical public goods
2dilemma. Our work can be viewed as an extension of
the literature on ABM approaches to the evolution of
cooperation [39, 40]. Specifically, we set our ABM to
compare with the results of two public goods game ex-
periments conducted by Fehr and Gachter [9, 10]. Our
modeling strategy is to see the empirical observations
in Fehr and Gachter’s experiments as a snapshot within
a long-term evolutionary dynamic. Our ABM mimics
the norm-gene co-evolution that has occurred over hun-
dreds and thousands of years. We calibrate our model
by means of empirical data, to quantitatively identify the
underlying preference types that drive the observed con-
temporary behavior in the corresponding dilemmas. In
doing so, our goal is to determine the conditions under
which agents develop spontaneously a propensity to “al-
truistically” punish, starting from an initial population of
uncooperative non-punishers. Here, we specifically look
into a set of common assumptions made by economists
to account for altruistic punishment behavior within the
framework of utility theory: Other-regarding preferences
in form of inequality and inequity aversion.
Initialized by variants of these other-regarding pref-
erences, the traits of our agents converge to statistically
stable distributions after long transients, which are taken
to describe the present-day characteristics of modern hu-
mans. In other words, the experiments of Fehr and
Gachter [9, 10] are interpreted as sampling the statis-
tically stationary characteristics of a cultural group of
subjects1 which have evolved over a long time horizon.
Their response to specific social dilemma situations are
then revealed through the present-day experiments. One
should, however, keep in mind that other patterns of be-
haviors may have emerged under different norms and ge-
netic endowments.
EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION
The design of our ABM is inspired by the two public
goods game experiments conducted by Fehr and Gachter
[9, 10]. In these experiments, subjects are arranged in
groups of n = 4 persons. At the beginning of each pe-
riod, subjects received an initial endowment of 20 mon-
etary units (MUs). Thereafter, subjects could invest
m ∈ [0, 20] MUs to a common group project, which re-
turned g1 = 1.6 MUs for each invested MU. The total
return from the project was then equally split and re-
distributed to all group members. Thus, the marginal
return per capita was g1/n = 0.4. As long as g1/n < 1,
the game has a vivid social dilemma component and the
setup is susceptible to defection through material self-
1 Here undergraduate students from the Federal Institute of Tech-
nology (ETH) and the University of Zurich
interest, since it is rationally optimal not to cooperate,
while the group is better off if each member cooperates.
Hence one can consider the subjects’ investment as their
level of cooperation.
In a second extended run, subjects were additionally
provided with the opportunity to punish other group
members, after they have received the project return and
have been informed about the individual contributions.
The use of punishment was associated with costs for both
parties, in which each MU spent by a punisher led to
rp = 3 MUs taken from the punished subject [10]
2. The
fact that punishment is costly and that the cost to the
punished one is larger (rp > 1) are important properties
of the experimental design, which are thought to capture
schematically many real life situations. Versions with and
without punishment were played both in a partner treat-
ment, in which the group composition did not change
across periods, and in a stranger treatment. In the later,
subjects were reassigned to new groups at each period
and thus were only engaged in one-shot interactions dur-
ing the entire runtime of the experiment. In total, the
experiments were played for T1 = 10 [9] and T2 = 6 pe-
riods [10] respectively3.
The data from Fehr and Gaechter as well as from sev-
eral other public goods experiments [35, 36, 37] show that
people, if provided the opportunity, frequently punish de-
fectors, even if this is costly to themselves. In the case of
repeated interactions, as in the partner treatment, such
behavior can be explained in a standard way as result-
ing from a strategic optimization performed by rational
selfish agents, who select the “direct reciprocity” mech-
anism for cooperation. What is more surprising is that
strangers continue to punish at a cost to themselves even
in one-shot interactions for which there is no positive
material gain, even in absence of mechanisms associated
with direct, indirect reciprocity and reputation building.
This behavior is referred to as “altruistic punishment” to
emphasize the conflict with the behavior expected from
purely rational agents. The question we address here is
why humans behave in a way that strictly contradicts ra-
tional choice, i.e., they continue to cooperate and punish
at a cost to themselves.
THE AGENT-BASED MODEL
We extend the setup of the altruistic punishment game
of Fehr and Gachter [10] to construct an ABM of a pop-
ulation of agents who play a public goods game with
2 In [9] the punisher paid approximately 2 MUs to take an addi-
tional 10% from the punished subject’s period profit.
3 To avoid the last round effect, we consider only data from periods
1− 9 and 1− 5, respectively.
3punishment, while adapting and evolving over long peri-
ods according to generic evolutionary dynamics. On the
short time scales of Fehr and Gachter’s experiments, the
traits of the human players probed by the games can be
considered fixed for each player. In contrast, our evolu-
tionary ABM aims at determining which superordinate
regime of other-regarding preferences have led our an-
cestors to develop traits promoting altruistic punishment
behavior. These traits might again be encoded in the cul-
tural context, in genes, or both. Thus, we let the traits
evolve over time according to standard evolutionary dy-
namics: Adaptation, selection, crossover and mutation.
In order to capture the possible evolution of the popula-
tion, agents adapt and die when unfit. Newborn agents
replace the dead ones, with traits taken from the pool
of the other surviving agents. Starting from an initial
population of agents with no cooperation and with no
propensity to punish others, we will find the emergence
of long-term stationary populations whose traits are in-
terpreted to represent those probed by contemporary ex-
periments, such as those of Fehr and Gachter.
The results presented below correspond to groups of
n = 4 agents as in the Fehr and Gachter’s experiments.
At the beginning of the simulation (time t = 0), each
agent is endowed with wi(0) = 0 MUs
4, which represents
its (human and material) capital. Each agent (i) is char-
acterized by two traits [mi(t) : ki(t)], her level of coop-
eration and her propensity to punish, that are subjected
to evolutionary forces.
ABM algorithm
A given simulation period t is decomposed into five
sub-periods with the following chronology.
1. Cooperation. Each agent i chooses an amount to
contribute to the group project referred to as her
level of cooperation. Combining all the contribu-
tions by all group members and splitting it equally,
this leads to a return per agent given by equation
(1).
2. Punishment. Given the returns from the project
and the agents’ cooperation levels which are re-
vealed to all, each agent may choose to punish the
other agents according to the rule defined by equa-
tion (3).
3. Consumption. Each agent consumes the amount
defined by equation (4).
4 Only the transient behavior is sensitive to the choice of this initial
wealth while the long-term results are independent of this initial
value.
4. Adaptation. Given her profit or loss (P&L) de-
fined by equation 5 , which results from the project
return minus her contribution and minus the cost of
punishments, an agent may adapt her cooperation
level mi(t) and her propensity to punish ki(t).
5. Evolution. An agent whose capital drops below 0
dies and is replaced by another agent whose traits
are inherited from the pool of survival agents with
some additional mutation.
These five steps are now described in details.
Cooperation step
As denoted before, the first trait of a given agent is
her intrinsic willingness to cooperate denoted by mi(t).
At each period t, the agent i contributes mi(t) MUs to
the group project. As in the lab experiment of Fehr and
Gachter, each MU invested in the group project returns
g1 = 1.6 MUs to the group. Each agent receives the same
return
r(t) = (g1/n) ·
n∑
j=1
mj(t) (1)
from the group project, resulting in a first-step profit or
loss of
si(t) = r(t) −mi(t) = (g1/n) ·
n∑
j=1
mj(t) − mi(t) , (2)
for a given agent i equal to the difference between the
project return and its contribution in period t.
Punishment step
Punishments in our ABM follow the same design as
in the experiments of Fehr and Gachter [9, 10]. To
choose the agents’ decision rules on when and how much
to punish, we are guided by figure 1 which shows the
mean expenditure of a given punisher as a function of
the deviation between her contribution minus that of the
punished individual, as reported empirically [10]. One
can observe an approximate proportionality between the
amount spent for punishing the lesser contributing agent
by the greater contributing agent and the pairwise dif-
ference mj(t) −mi(t) of their contributions. The figure
includes data from both the partner and the stranger
treatments in the two sets of experiments [9, 10]. In our
ABM, this linear dependence, with threshold, is chosen
to represent how an agent i decides to punish another
agent j by spending an amount given by
pi→j(t) =
{
ki(t) · (mi(t)−mj(t)) mi(t) ≥ mj(t) ,
0 otherwise.
(3)
4FIG. 1: Mean expenditure of a given punishing member as
a function of the deviation between her contribution minus
that of the punished member, for all pairs of subjects within
a group, as reported empirically [10]. The straight line cross-
ing zero shows the average decision rule for punishment that
our agents spontaneously evolve to at long times. Its slope
−k ≈ −0.2 defines the average propensity k to punish (see
the main text). The anomalous punishment of cooperators,
corresponding to the positive range along the horizontal axis,
is neglected in our model.
The coefficient ki(t), which represents the propensity
to punish, is the second trait that characterizes agent i at
time t. It is not fixed to the average value k ≈ 0.2 found
in the experiments. It is allowed to vary from agent to
agent and it evolves as a function of the successes and fail-
ures experienced by each agent, as explained below. In
addition to being motivated by the data shown in figure
1, the punishment rule (3) can be thought of as a mini-
malist description of proportional response to defection.
We will see that, given certain fairness preferences are
activated, evolution makes the punishment propensities
ki(t) self-organize towards a distribution closely resem-
bling the empirical data.
As a result of being punished the wealth of the pun-
ished agent j is reduced by the amount spend by agent
i multiplied by the punishment impact factor rp. As in
Fehr and Gachter’s second experiment, we fix the pun-
ishment impact factor to rp = 3.
Consumption step
Consumption is introduced as a realistic driving force
to select for successful agents and remove unfit ones. At
each period, consumption absorbs an amount c(t) of the
capital of each agent. The amount is assumed to be de-
termined by the social context, specifically as the change
of average group wealth (w¯(t)) over the last period:
c(t) = Max[w¯(t− 1)− w¯(t− 2) ; 0] . (4)
The proportionality between consumption and income
captures the evidence that, for modern societies, con-
sumption is indeed roughly proportional to income, at
least for 99% of the population that exclude the super-
wealthy [41, 42]. In primitive societies, larger human
and material capital led also to larger consumption in
the form of producing more offsprings5. The form of
consumption (eq. 4) is intended to capture the survival
needs and selection pressure that are determined relative
to the social group.
Wealth balance
The total P&L sˆi(t) of an agent i over one period of
her life is thus the sum of three components: (i) Her first
step P&L si(t) from the group project (equation (2)), (ii)
the MUs
∑
j 6=i pi→j(t) spent to punish others and (iii) the
punishments rp
∑
j 6=i pj→i(t) received from others, where
pi→j(t) and pj→i(t) are given by (3):
sˆi(t) = si(t)−
∑
j 6=i
pi→j(t)− rp
∑
j 6=i
pj→i(t) . (5)
Equation 5 represents the second step P&L of agent i in
period t. Putting this all together, the wealth (fitness)
of agent i thus increases or decreases at each period t
according to
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + sˆi(t)− c(t) . (6)
Adaptation Dynamics
The traits [mi(t); ki(t)] characterizing each agent i at
a given time t evolve with time according to standard
evolutionary dynamics: Adaptation, selection, crossover
and mutation. As has been argued (e.g. by Arthur [43]
or Holland [44]), humans (and our ancestors) are likely to
use inductive reasoning to make decisions. In particular,
this means that humans tend to replace working hypothe-
ses with new ones when the old ones cease to work. We
adopt this bounded rational approach to define adapta-
tion rules determining the propensity to punish and the
level of cooperations chosen by agents.
Adaptation of the propensity to punish. To identify
which type of preference norm drive the evolution of
5 While we account for this larger proportional consumption, we
do not include a population dynamics, as our model assumes
a constant group size n, with each death being followed by a
corresponding birth.
5the trait ki(t) associated with the propensity to pun-
ish to a level, that is observed in the experiments, we
test a distinct set of adaption rules. Each adaption rule
corresponds to a specific subset of other-regarding pref-
erence relations. Here, we specifically focus on differ-
ent variants of inequality and inequity aversion prefer-
ences and therefore consider the five following types of
agents: (A) self-regarding, (B) inequality averse, (C) in-
equity averse, (D) disadvantageous inequality averse and
(E) disadvantageous inequity averse. Here “disadvanta-
geous” indicates that agents are only inequality/inequity
averse if the inequality/inequity plays to their disadvan-
tage, whereas pure inequality or inequity avers agents
dislike both, situations in which they have been discrim-
inated as well as situations in which they discriminated
others.
In each given simulation, we use only homogeneous
populations, that is, we group only agents of the same
type.
A: self-regarding agents: In this universe, an agent
updates her propensity to punish only if her P&L
sˆi(t) given by (5) obtained on the previous invest-
ment period turns out to be smaller than her re-
quired consumption c(t). The update consists in
an unbiased random increment according to6
ki(t+ 1) = ki(t) + κ[−0.005,0.005] , (7)
where κ is a uniformly distributed random number
drawn from the interval indicated in the subscript.
Only draws of κ’s that ensure positiveness of ki(t+
1) are allowed.
B: inequality averse agents: In this universe, an
agent i updates her propensity to punish if her P&L
sˆi(t) given by (5) is not within a specific tolerance
range [−l,+l] around the average P&L of the other
members of her group, i.e. if (sˆi(t) < s¯(t) − l)
or (sˆi(t) > s¯(t) + l). When this occurs agent i
updates her ki(t) according to equation (7). We run
multiple simulations initialized by different values
for l as presented in the results section.
C: inequity averse agents: In this universe, agents
set their P&L in relation to their contributions: An
agent i updates her propensity to punish according
to eq. (7), if...
(upside inequity) ...she has contributed less than or
equally to her group fellows (mi(t) ≤ m¯(t)), where
the average m¯(t) is performed over the contribu-
tions of the other members of her group and, at the
6 Our results are robust to changes of the width of the interval, as
long as it remains symmetric around zero.
same time, has received a total P&L sˆi(t) defined
in (5) larger than or equal to the group average
(sˆi(t) ≥ s¯(t)), where the average s¯(t) is performed
over the other group members)...
(downside inequity) ...or she has contributed more
than or equally to her group fellows (mi(t) ≥ m¯(t))
and, at the same time, has received a total P&L less
than or equal to the group average (sˆi(t) ≤ s¯(t)).
D: disadvantageous inequality averse agents: In
this universe, agents only dislike situations in which
the inequality is to their’s disadvantage:
(downside inequality) An agent i updates her
propensity to punish only if her P&L sˆi(t) given by
(5) is smaller than the average P&L of the other
members of her group, i.e. (sˆi(t) < s¯(t)). When
this occurs for an agent i, she updates her ki(t)
according to equation (7).
E: disadvantageous inequity averse agents: Like-
wise to setup (C), agents set their P&L in relation
to their contributions, however they only dislike sit-
uation in which the inequity is detrimental to them.
(downside inequity) If an agent i has contributed
equally or more than her fellows in the group
(mi(t) ≥ m¯(t)) and, at the same time, has received
a total P&L sˆi(t) defined in (5) smaller than or
equal to the group average (sˆi(t) ≤ s¯(t)), then she
updates her propensity to punish according to eq.
(7).
Adaptation of the cooperation level. Following the
proverb “necessity is the mother of all invention,” agents
adapt their cooperation level mi(t) under adverse condi-
tions, i.e., when their P&L in the last investment round
is smaller than the required consumption c(t). When
this adverse situation occurs, an agent randomly up-
dates her contribution according to mi(t+ 1) = mi(t) +
ǫ[−0.005,0.005], where ǫ is a random number uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval indicated in the subscript.7 Since
contributions are non-negative, only those draws of ǫ are
kept that ensure the positiveness of mi(t+ 1).
Replicator Dynamics: Selection, crossover and
mutation
In addition to the adaptation of the agents’ traits
[mi(t); ki(t)] described above, evolution occurs by replac-
ing under-performing agents. When an agent’s wealth
wi(t) drops below zero, the agent dies and is replaced by
7 Our results are robust to changes of the width of this interval as
long as it remains symmetrical.
6a new one with different traits [mi(t + 1), ki(t + 1)], de-
termined by those of the surviving agents of the group.
The following variants give essentially the same results.
• To capture the phenomenon that norms and genes
are inherited from the pool of existing agents, a
first variant assumes that the new agent has her
traits simply equal to the average of those of the
surviving agents.
• A second variant consists in assuming a noisy in-
heritance of the average traits of the group mem-
bers. Specifically, the new agent has traits equal to
the average of those of the surviving agents plus a
noise proportional to the standard deviation of the
surviving agents’ traits.
• A third variant first determines clusters among
the agents, including the newborn, using a stan-
dard clustering algorithm on the vectors of the two
traits. The existence of several clusters is taken
to account for the possible emergence of heteroge-
neous sets of norms within the group. Then, the
newborn takes the average traits of the agents in
her cluster, decorated by an additional mutation
implemented by adding a random number to each
trait proportional to the standard deviation of the
surviving agents’ traits.
THE EMERGENCE OF ALTRUISTIC
PUNISHMENT
We have run our ABM with thousands of independent
groups of n = 4 agents over one million simulation pe-
riods t. The agents have a double peak distribution of
lifetimes, with a mean of the order of 1.7 · 104 periods
and a median of the order of 1.5 · 104 periods8. This
expresses that, while many agents die at an early age,
also many survive beyond their “childhood”, enabling
them to adapt their traits. Each run thus corresponds
to several hundreds of generations. Each simulation has
been initialized with all agents being uncooperative non-
punishers, i.e., ki(0) = 0 and mi(0) = 0 for all i’s. Af-
ter a long transient, we observe that the distribution
of propensities to punish converges to different station-
ary functions depending on which adaptation dynamics
(A,B,C,D or E) for k is active.
In the following we give a qualitative analysis of
our simulation results. Selfish agents adapting their
propensity to punish according to dynamics (A) remain
weak punishers, and no significant “altruistic punish-
ment” is observed as shown in the inset of figure 2.
8 These lifetimes correspond to a population of disadvantageous
inequity avers agents (E)
In contrast, for agents endowed with inequality or in-
equity aversion (adaptation rules B to E), stationary
states of the propensity to punish emerge spontaneously,
each with different characteristics. For all adaptation
rules (B to E) it holds, that altruistic punishment has
emerged endogenously as an evolutionary stable trait in
the competitive resource-limited world described by our
model. The responsible key ingredients are the variants
of other-regarding preferences (B,C,D or E). It should
be stressed that a symmetric (upside and downside) in-
equity/inequality aversion is not needed as a condition to
let altruistic punishment emerge. The selfish disadvan-
tageous inequality or inequity aversion (dynamics D and
E) is sufficient.
We now turn to a quantitative characterization of the
properties of the altruistic cooperators that evolved in
our ABM. Figure 2 compares the stationary distributions
of the propensities to punish obtained with our ABM at
long times for the four adaptation dynamics (B to E)
with that obtained in Fehr and Gachter’s experiment9.
The propensities to punish in the experimental data have
been inferred as follows: Knowing the contributionsmi >
mj of two subjects i and j and the punishment level
pi→j of subject i on subject j, the propensity to punish
characterizing subject i is determined by
ki = −
pi→j
mj −mi
. (8)
Applying this recipe to all pairs of subjects in a given
group, we obtain twelve measures of propensities to pun-
ish per group. We then take the average over these twelve
values to obtain a single robust estimation associated
with a given group. Sampling all groups and all periods,
we obtain the distribution shown in figure 2 (continuous
thick line (emp)).
Figure 2 suggests that the adaptation dynamics E (dis-
advantageous inequity averse agents) is the only one able
to fit the empirical distribution. Indeed, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test cannot reject the hypothesis that the k val-
ues evolved in our ABM world for the adaptation dynam-
ics E and the empirical values are drawn from the same
distribution at the 80% confidence level (p-value ≃ 0.2).
In contrast, the other adaptation dynamics A to D are
strongly rejected (p-value = 0). Given the simplicity of
our ABM and of its underlying assumptions, it is strik-
ing to find such detailed quantitative agreement for one
of our dynamics.
For selfish agents (dynamics A), we found that the
weak level of punishment that evolved in the ABM is
entirely controlled by selection pressure, and thus the
presence of consumption. In particular, in the absence of
any selection pressure, the level of altruistic punishment
9 We used the data from the [9, 10] stranger treatments.
7FIG. 2: Distributions of propensities to punish in Fehr and
Gachter’s experiments (emp) and in our ABM at long times
under the five different adaptation dynamics (A to E) under
800 system realizations. The inset shows the smoothed dis-
tribution for the self-regarding agent population (adaptation
dynamics A), while the main frame plots the smoothed dis-
tributions obtained by the adaptation rules B to E as well
as for the empirical data (emp). All distributions has been
smoothed by a standard kernel method. (emp): Distribution
estimated from Fehr and Gachter’s experiments using the pro-
cedure explained in the text; the other distribution estimates
correspond to the adaptation dynamic A to E. For adapta-
tion dynamic (B) the plot shows the obtained distributions
for all tolerance range parameters l ∈ 0.1; 0.075; 0.05; 0.025; 0
(from the mode close to the origin (l = 0.1) to the mode far-
thest (l = 0). The parameters of our ABM simulations are:
n = 4, g1 = 1.6, rp = 3.
drops to zero. In all other cases, it remains too small to
explain the empirical results of Fehr and Gachter. For
the inequality averse population (B) it become obvious,
that within a symmetric variation of the tolerance range
parameter l the empirical distribution can not be repro-
duces: Figure 2 shows the resulting distributions for the
tested values l ∈ [0; 0.025; 0.05; 0.075; 0.1] as thin dashed
lines, with l = 0.1 corresponding to the mode close to
the origin going stepwise to l = 0 with the mode farthest
from the origin. For inequity avers agents (dynamics C)
and disadvantageous inequality averse agents (dynamics
D), we find levels of altruistic punishments that far ex-
ceed the empirical evidence. Our quantitative compar-
ison with Fehr and Gachter’s experiments supports the
hypothesis that human subjects are well-described as be-
ing disadvantageous inequity averse, corroborating and
complementing previous evidence [17, 18, 19]. The re-
sults obtained with our ABM simulations suggest that
the co-evolution of norms and genes promoting altruistic
punishment have been influenced by disadvantageous in-
equity aversion in the presence of simple inductive strate-
gies, leading to self-sustained co-evolving traits made ro-
bust by reinforcing feedbacks.
The distribution of propensities ki to punish exhibits a
mode around k = 0.2, which means that most punishers
spend an amount approximately equal to one-fifth of the
experienced differences in contributions. Note that the
value of the mode around k = 0.2 is close to the slope of
the straight line fitting the empirical data shown in fig-
ure 1 providing another confirmation of the explanatory
power of our ABM. This most probable value k = 0.2
has also been obtained analytically by assuming an evo-
lutionary optimization of the expected gains with respect
to potential future losses due to punishment [34].
THE EFFECT OF THE PROPENSITY TO
PUNISH ON COOPERATION
We now demonstrate with our model that punishment
is a key stabilization mechanism for sustaining coopera-
tion. For this, we need some destabilizing process that
tends to destroy cooperation in the absence of punish-
ment. The experiments of Fehr and Gachter suggest
such a mechanism. A detailed analysis of the period-
by-period decision outcomes made by human subjects
shows evidence of short-term persistence in their updates
of cooperation levels: Previous changes mi(t − 2) →
mi(t− 1) of contributions that led to larger return from
the project (si(t− 1) > si(t − 2)) are followed by subse-
quent updates mi(t − 1) → mi(t), with the same trend:
[mi(t)−mi(t− 1)] · [mi(t− 1)−mi(t− 2)] > 0). We refer
to this behavior as using a “trend-following strategy.”
When we add the trend-following strategy to our 4-
step algorithm as described above but, in the absence of
punishment (all k’s are imposed equal to 0), we find that
cooperation that was maintained previously in the pres-
ence of punishment decays after a few thousand periods
as shown in figure 3. In contrast, if punishment is re-
stored in the presence of the destabilizing trend-following
strategy, cooperation remains stable. Note also that the
emergence of the stable distribution of propensity to pun-
ish reported in figure 2 is robust to the addition of the
trend-following strategies used by the agents.
Figure 4 shows the average level of cooperation in a
group of 4 agents after a transient period of 20,000 sim-
ulation periods for 800 system realizations as a function
of the propensity k to punish, when the level of cooper-
ation for all agents is initially drawn from a uniformly
distributed random variable in {49, 51}. It reveals that
the level of cooperation undergoes a bifurcation from zero
to significant levels of cooperation, for a value of k close
to the mode of the empirical distribution of the propen-
sities to punish. This suggests that evolution may have
selected an “optimal” propensity to punish altruistically
defectors in order to sustain cooperation.
8FIG. 3: Average group contribution for a group of 4 agents
with punishment (k = 0.2 - continuous line) and without (k =
0 - dashed line) over 20,000 simulation periods and 16 system
realizations. The initial contribution mi(0) for all agents i
of a group is randomly drawn form a uniform distribution in
{49, 51}.
FIG. 4: Average group contribution for a group of 4 agents
as a function of k after an equilibrium time of 20000 simu-
lation periods and 800 system realizations. k is fixed to the
corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution
mi(0) for all agents i of a group is randomly drawn form a
uniform distribution in {49, 51}.
To corroborate this hypothesis, figure 5 plots the av-
erage amount of MUs spent to punish a defector during
10000 simulation periods for 3200 system realizations as
a function of the propensity to punish k. As in the setup
of figure 4, the level of cooperation mi(t) for all agents
is initialized at period t = 0 by a random variable uni-
formly distributed in {49, 50}. We now consider the in-
trinsic propensity to punish k as the potential exposure
of defectors to being punished. The results show clearly,
that a higher deterrence, i.e. a higher value of k, effec-
tively causes less exertion of costly punishment in order
to maintain a certain level of cooperation and norm con-
FIG. 5: Average punishment spent to punish defectors for a
group of 4 agents as a function of k after an equilibrium time
of 20000 simulation periods and 800 system realizations. k is
fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial
contribution mi(0) in period 0 for all agents i of a group is
randomly drawn form a uniform distribution in {49, 51}.
formity, respectively. This responsive behavior has been
manifested in many empirical observations [46, 47].
Given, that disadvantageous inequity aversion is the
dominant preference type, cooperation and norm confor-
mity can be maintained at lower costs if the propensity
to punish, i.e. the level of deterrence, exceeds the tip-
ping point of k at ≃ 0.2. This again substantiates, that
evolution may have selected an “optimal” propensity to
punish to sustain cooperation and prevent defection in
contexts where people behave disadvantageous inequity
averse. Comparable results have been obtain using a dif-
ferent simulation model as has been reported in [45].
CONCLUSION
Our first principal result is that a high level of altru-
istic punishment behavior emerges spontaneously from
a population of agents who are initially uncooperative
and non-punishers. We have shown how this results from
evolution with adaptation, selection, crossover and mu-
tation, in a population of agents endowed with different
variants of inequality or inequity aversion. We stress that
our use of the terms “inequality” or “inequity aversion”
does not mean that a new term is added in the agents’
utility function that controls their decisions; in contrast,
we only assume that agents may punish as a reaction to
differences in observed contributions to a group project.
Thus, a key ingredient is the possibility for agents to pun-
ish, at a cost to themselves, and that the punishment be
efficient (in the sense rp > 1). As a consequence of the co-
evolution of traits characterizing agents’ cooperation and
punishment, we obtain the emergence of altruistic pun-
ishment behavior. A fully symmetric (upside and down-
9side) inequity/inequality aversion is not needed to obtain
our results, with the selfish disadvantageous inequality or
inequity aversion being sufficient.
Our second main result is the identification of disad-
vantageous inequity aversion as the most relevant under-
lying mechanism to explain the emergence and the degree
of altruistic punishment observed in public goods exper-
iments. This result has been obtained by combining em-
pirical data with an evolutionary agent-based simulation
model in an innovative way. Our ABM is able to repro-
duce quantitatively, without adjustable parameters, the
experimental results concerning the most likely levels of
punishment behavior, as well as their full distribution.
This result is of particular importance to substantiate the
assumptions made by economists in order to describe re-
alistic behavior within the framework of rational choice:
Humans exhibit other-regarding, and in particular, dis-
advantageous inequity aversion preferences in their deci-
sion process.
In conclusion, we believe that the combination of em-
pirical research and agent-based modeling as done here
can provide deeper insights into the apparently non-
rational behavior of humans. For instance, with regard
to the often-cited importance of altruistic punishment
in promoting cooperation, our ABM provides a flexible
and powerful methodology to answer many remaining re-
search questions, including the influence of group interac-
tions, competitions between variants of other-regarding
preferences or the interplay of other mechanisms, as well
as more realistic set-ups in which agents are playing sev-
eral games simultaneously so as to mimic a real life situ-
ation in which cognitive abilities and human capital are
scarce resources.
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